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Abstract	  In	  line	  with	  recent	  efforts	  to	  empirically	  study	  the	  folk	  concept	  of	  weakness	  of	  will,	  we	  examine	  two	  issues	  in	  this	  paper:	  (1)	  How	  is	  weakness	  of	  will	  attribution	  [WWA]	  influenced	  by	  an	  agent’s	  violations	  of	  best	  judgment	  and/or	  resolution,	  and	  by	  the	  moral	  valence	  of	  the	  agent’s	  action?	  (2)	  Do	  any	  of	  these	  influences	  depend	  on	  the	  cognitive	  dispositions	  of	  the	  judging	  individual?	  We	  implemented	  a	  factorial	  2x2x2	  between–subjects	  design	  with	  judgment	  violation,	  resolution	  violation,	  and	  action	  valence	  as	  independent	  variables,	  and	  measured	  participants’	  cognitive	  dispositions	  using	  Frederick’s	  Cognitive	  Reflection	  Test	  [CRT].	  We	  conclude	  that	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  individuals	  have	  two	  different	  concepts	  of	  weakness	  of	  will.	  The	  study	  supports	  this	  claim	  by	  showing	  that:	  a)	  the	  WWA	  of	  intuitive	  subjects	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  action’s	  (and	  probably	  also	  the	  commitment’s)	  moral	  valence,	  while	  the	  WWA	  of	  reflective	  subjects	  is	  not;	  b)	  judgment	  violation	  plays	  a	  small	  role	  in	  the	  WWA	  of	  intuitive	  subjects,	  while	  reflective	  subjects	  treat	  resolution	  violation	  as	  the	  only	  relevant	  trait.	  Data	  were	  collected	  among	  students	  at	  two	  different	  universities.	  All	  subjects	  (N=710)	  answered	  the	  CRT.	  A	  three-­‐way	  ANOVA	  was	  first	  conducted	  on	  the	  whole	  sample	  and	  then	  on	  the	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  groups	  separately.	  This	  study	  suggests	  that	  differences	  in	  cognitive	  dispositions	  can	  significantly	  impact	  the	  folk	  understanding	  of	  philosophical	  concepts,	  and	  thus	  suggests	  that	  analysis	  of	  folk	  concepts	  should	  take	  cognitive	  dispositions	  into	  account.	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1.	  Introduction	  
	  
Recent	  empirical	  approaches	  to	  weakness	  of	  will	  attribution	  When	  we	  say	  that	  someone	  is	  weak-­‐willed,	  what	  do	  we	  mean?	  The	  two	  main	  philosophical	  accounts	  portray	  weakness	  of	  will	  either	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  stick	  to	  one’s	  best,	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  judgment	  (Mele	  1995)	  or	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  abide	  by	  one’s	  resolution	  in	  the	  face	  of	  temptation	  (Holton	  1999).	  After	  gathering	  some	  data	  about	  folk	  uses	  of	  the	  concept,	  Mele	  and	  Holton	  have	  arrived	  at	  an	  agreement	  that	  both	  judgment	  violation	  and	  resolution	  violation	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  concept,	  given	  the	  way	  people	  tend	  to	  attribute	  weakness	  of	  will	  (Mele	  2010;	  May	  &	  Holton	  2012).	  But	  questions	  remain	  about	  the	  relative	  weights	  of	  judgment	  violation	  and	  resolution	  violation,	  and	  about	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  moral	  valence	  of	  the	  action	  on	  weakness	  of	  will	  attribution	  [WWA];	  and	  more	  generally,	  about	  whether	  these	  influences	  systematically	  depend	  on	  personality	  dimensions	  like	  intuitive	  or	  reflective	  cognitive	  dispositions.	  	  Mele	  (2010)	  suggested	  that	  judgment	  violation	  and	  resolution	  violation	  are	  independently	  sufficient	  for	  WWA,	  i.e.,	  that	  the	  two	  criteria	  work	  disjunctively.	  He	  tried	  to	  produce	  an	  empirical	  proof	  of	  the	  sufficiency	  of	  judgment	  violation	  by	  registering	  participant	  responses	  to	  a	  vignette	  about	  an	  agent	  who	  acts	  against	  his	  better	  judgment	  but	  explicitly	  avoids	  forming	  any	  resolution.	  He	  found	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  subjects	  attribute	  weakness	  of	  will	  in	  that	  case.	  May	  &	  Holton	  (2012)	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  vignette	  allows	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  agent	  as	  forming	  a	  second-­‐order	  resolution	  (to	  make	  a	  first-­‐order	  resolution	  at	  an	  appropriate	  time)	  that	  he	  then	  violates.	  To	  more	  comprehensively	  address	  the	  issue,	  they	  developed	  a	  factorial	  2x2	  design	  with	  4	  vignettes	  where	  the	  agent	  violated	  her	  resolution,	  her	  best	  judgment,	  both,	  or	  neither.	  This	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  check	  for	  independent	  main	  effects	  of	  resolution	  violation	  and	  judgment	  violation,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  interaction.	  They	  carried	  out	  two	  experiments.	  The	  first	  experiment’s	  vignettes	  lacked	  uniformity	  (the	  agent’s	  actions	  had	  various	  valences,	  two	  representing	  adultery	  with	  different	  motivations,	  another	  one	  a	  courageous	  but	  imprudent	  action,	  and	  yet	  another	  one	  the	  violation	  of	  a	  diet).	  Since	  uncontrolled	  variables	  may	  have	  interfered,	  they	  ran	  a	  second	  experiment	  with	  uniform	  vignettes	  in	  which	  an	  agent	  either	  performs	  or	  does	  not	  perform	  a	  skydiving	  jump	  violating	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either	  his	  prior	  judgment,	  his	  resolution,	  both	  or	  neither.	  Both	  experiments	  yielded	  roughly	  similar	  results:	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  for	  each	  violation	  independently,	  but	  significantly	  higher	  scores	  when	  both	  violations	  occurred	  together.	  This	  suggested	  that	  weakness	  of	  will	  is	  not	  a	  disjunctive	  concept,	  but	  rather	  works	  like	  a	  cluster	  of	  both	  violation	  criteria.	  In	  May	  and	  Holton’s	  second	  experiment,	  the	  courageous	  nature	  of	  the	  action	  (skydiving)	  seems	  to	  have	  pulled	  WWA	  down	  to	  the	  midpoint	  when	  the	  agent	  jumps	  against	  both	  his	  best	  judgment	  and	  resolution.	  Therefore,	  apparently,	  the	  action’s	  positive	  valence	  had	  a	  significant	  influence	  in	  some	  participants’	  WWA	  independently	  of	  commitment	  violations.	  In	  a	  third	  experiment,	  May	  and	  Holton	  investigated	  whether	  the	  action’s	  valence	  influenced	  WWA,	  and	  confirmed	  that	  the	  action’s	  immoral	  valence	  had	  a	  main	  effect	  on	  WWA	  independently	  of	  whether	  the	  agent	  violates	  or	  conforms	  to	  her	  prior	  commitments.	  	  Two	  subsequent	  papers	  bracketed	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  relative	  weights	  of	  judgment	  and	  resolution	  violation,	  and	  focused	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  action’s	  valence	  on	  WWA.	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro	  (2014)	  merged	  judgment	  and	  resolution	  into	  a	  single	  commitment	  that	  was	  either	  moral	  or	  immoral,	  and	  paired	  it	  with	  either	  a	  moral	  or	  an	  immoral	  action,	  thereby	  creating	  four	  vignettes:	  1)	  moral	  commitment	  and	  immoral	  action;	  2)	  moral	  commitment	  and	  moral	  action	  (these	  two	  they	  called	  ‘prototypical’,	  presumably	  since	  they	  are	  the	  situations	  commonly	  associated	  with	  the	  concepts	  of	  weakness	  and	  strength	  of	  will,	  respectively);	  3)	  immoral	  commitment	  and	  immoral	  action;	  and	  4)	  immoral	  commitment	  and	  moral	  action	  (these	  two	  they	  called	  ‘non-­‐prototypical’,	  since	  they	  are	  less	  commonly	  associated	  with	  the	  traditional	  concepts).	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro	  (2014)	  predicted	  that	  ordinary	  people	  would	  hesitate	  to	  attribute	  strength	  of	  will	  in	  3)	  and	  weakness	  of	  will	  in	  4),	  even	  though	  this	  is	  what	  the	  philosophical	  concepts	  would	  dictate.	  The	  reason	  for	  hesitation	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  evaluative	  tension	  between	  the	  action’s	  immorality	  (negative)	  and	  the	  agent’s	  compliance	  with	  his	  prior	  commitment	  (positive)	  in	  3),	  and	  between	  the	  moral	  action	  (positive)	  and	  the	  agent’s	  violation	  of	  his	  prior	  commitment	  (negative)	  in	  4).	  But	  they	  found	  that	  in	  3)	  and	  4)	  (i.e.	  the	  non-­‐prototypical	  cases)	  responses	  formed	  a	  threefold	  pattern:	  a)	  some	  participants	  hesitated	  to	  attribute	  weakness	  or	  strength	  of	  will,	  probably	  due	  to	  the	  evaluative	  tension	  mentioned	  above;	  b)	  other	  participants	  gave	  orthodox	  responses,	  attributing	  weakness	  of	  will	  only	  when	  the	  agent	  violated	  her	  commitment,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  valence	  of	  actions	  or	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commitments;	  and	  c)	  another	  group	  of	  participants	  gave	  unorthodox	  responses,	  attributing	  weakness	  of	  will	  when	  the	  agent	  acted	  immorally,	  and	  strength	  of	  will	  when	  he	  acted	  morally	  (probably	  guided	  by	  the	  action’s	  valence	  rather	  than	  the	  commitment	  violation	  or	  compliance).	  To	  explain	  the	  latter	  group’s	  unorthodox	  responses	  –	  which	  radically	  departed	  from	  the	  philosophical	  concept	  –,	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro	  postulated	  that	  those	  participants	  were	  implicitly	  attributing	  judgments	  and/or	  resolutions	  to	  the	  agent:	  thus,	  when	  the	  agent	  acted	  immorally,	  participants	  attributed	  an	  implicit	  moral	  commitment	  whose	  violation	  resulted	  in	  weakness	  of	  will;	  and	  when	  the	  agent	  acted	  morally,	  they	  attributed	  an	  implicit	  moral	  commitment	  whose	  adherence	  resulted	  in	  strength	  of	  will.	  Thus,	  their	  reading	  transformed	  unorthodox	  responses	  into	  orthodox	  ones,	  against	  the	  literal	  reading	  of	  the	  vignettes.	  (Here	  it	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  this	  hypothesis	  can	  find	  support	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  their	  vignettes:	  the	  agents	  are	  in	  fact	  described	  as	  being	  in	  conflict	  between	  moral	  and	  immoral	  commitments,	  or	  at	  least	  as	  pondering	  both	  alternatives	  before	  deciding.	  Thus,	  the	  vignettes	  themselves	  would	  give	  participants	  some	  ground	  to	  attribute	  implicit	  commitments	  to	  the	  agent.)	  	  Doucet	  &	  Turri	  (2014)	  questioned	  this	  explanation.	  They	  reported	  evidence	  that	  the	  action’s	  valence	  influences	  WWA	  directly,	  without	  the	  mediation	  of	  implicit	  commitment	  attributions.	  Their	  study	  2	  tested	  whether	  WWA	  was	  mediated	  by	  implicit	  attributions	  of	  moral	  commitments,	  and	  yielded	  negative	  results.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro	  (2014),	  Doucet	  and	  Turri’s	  vignettes	  do	  not	  describe	  agents	  as	  being	  in	  conflict	  before	  forming	  their	  commitment.	  Participants	  thus	  had	  no	  encouragement	  to	  make	  implicit	  attributions.	  	  	  What	  then	  accounts	  for	  the	  unorthodox	  responses	  of	  participants	  who	  depart	  from	  the	  philosophical	  weakness-­‐of-­‐will	  concept?	  If	  no	  implicit	  commitment	  attribution	  mediates	  such	  responses,	  then	  moral	  valence	  seems	  to	  directly	  influence	  WWA.	  But	  why	  then	  would	  the	  influence	  of	  moral	  valence	  be	  stronger	  in	  some	  participants	  than	  in	  others?	  An	  interesting	  hint	  may	  be	  given	  by	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro,	  who	  suggested	  that	  participants	  whose	  the	  unorthodox	  responses	  departed	  from	  the	  philosophical	  concept	  would	  tend	  to	  have	  an	  
intuitive	  rather	  than	  reflective	  cognitive	  disposition	  (Frederick	  2005).	  Doucet	  and	  Turri	  did	  not	  control	  for	  the	  cognitive	  dispositions	  of	  participants,	  so	  this	  hint	  remains	  empirically	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untested.	  It	  would	  mean	  that	  moral	  valence	  directly	  influences	  WWA	  (as	  Doucet	  and	  Turri	  contend),	  but	  that	  this	  influence	  depends	  on	  having	  an	  intuitive	  cognitive	  disposition.	  The	  rationale	  behind	  this	  is	  that	  immorality	  and	  weakness	  of	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  strongly	  intuitively	  associated,	  since	  they	  are	  both	  negative	  evaluative	  traits.	  To	  explain	  this	  further	  we	  introduce	  the	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  dispositions.	  	  
Cognitive	  dispositions	  and	  weakness	  of	  will	  attribution	  When	  you	  face	  a	  question	  and	  intuitively	  come	  up	  with	  an	  answer,	  what	  do	  you	  do?	  Do	  you	  endorse	  your	  intuitive	  answer	  right	  away,	  or	  do	  you	  examine	  the	  intuition	  critically	  before	  endorsing	  it?	  We	  call	  people	  who	  tend	  to	  do	  the	  former	  intuitive,	  and	  those	  who	  do	  the	  latter	  reflective.	  These	  are	  the	  two	  cognitive	  dispositions	  that	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  present	  study.	  The	  distinction	  between	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  dispositions	  relies	  on	  a	  broadly	  dual-­‐process	  account	  of	  human	  cognition,	  which	  distinguishes	  between	  automatic	  or	  intuitive	  processes	  that	  can	  be	  performed	  independently	  from	  working	  memory,	  and	  reflective	  processes	  whose	  performance	  requires	  the	  use	  of	  working	  memory	  (Evans	  2010;	  Evans	  &	  Stanovich	  2013).	  Here	  ‘working	  memory’	  (Baddeley	  2007)	  refers	  to	  the	  set	  of	  higher-­‐order	  cognitive	  capacities	  that	  allow	  for	  the	  mental	  manipulation	  of	  task-­‐oriented	  representations.	  Intuitive	  processes	  tend	  to	  be	  fast,	  effortless,	  and	  require	  no	  concentration;	  reflective	  processes	  tend	  to	  be	  slower	  and	  require	  cognitive	  effort	  and	  concentration.	  Intuitive	  people	  tend	  to	  rely	  on	  heuristic,	  rough-­‐and-­‐ready	  responses	  to	  questions	  and	  problems,	  while	  reflective	  people	  tend	  to	  double-­‐check	  those	  heuristic	  solutions	  by	  means	  of	  step-­‐by-­‐step,	  working-­‐memory-­‐reliant	  processes.	  	  Cognitive	  dispositions	  are	  personality	  traits	  concerning	  how	  likely	  a	  person	  is	  to	  engage	  in	  reflective	  processes	  to	  assess	  the	  outcomes	  of	  her	  own	  intuitive	  processes.	  This	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  means	  of	  the	  Cognitive	  Reflection	  Test	  (or	  CRT),	  whose	  questions	  are	  designed	  to	  elicit	  intuitive	  answers	  that	  are	  nonetheless	  incorrect.	  In	  order	  to	  reach	  the	  right	  answer,	  the	  participant	  would	  have	  to	  reflectively	  inhibit	  the	  intuitive	  response	  and	  concentrate	  on	  seeking	  the	  right	  answer	  (Frederick	  2005).	  The	  CRT	  consists	  of	  three	  questions,	  and	  the	  participant	  score	  is	  the	  number	  of	  questions	  she	  gets	  right.	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Consider	  again	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  Studies	  of	  folk	  WWA	  have	  found	  that	  some	  participants	  make	  unorthodox	  weakness	  of	  will	  attributions:	  they	  attribute	  weakness	  of	  will	  to	  an	  agent	  who	  sticks	  to	  an	  immoral	  commitment	  by	  performing	  an	  immoral	  action;	  and	  they	  attribute	  strength	  of	  will	  to	  an	  agent	  who	  breaks	  an	  immoral	  commitment	  by	  performing	  a	  moral	  action	  (Sousa	  &	  Mauro	  2014).	  How	  can	  we	  explain	  this	  if,	  as	  Doucet	  and	  Turri’s	  (2014)	  work	  suggests,	  participants	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  implicitly	  attribute	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  agent?	  	  	  The	  answer	  may	  lie	  in	  the	  difference	  in	  cognitive	  dispositions.	  An	  immoral	  action	  would	  tend	  to	  intuitively	  and	  automatically	  elicit	  high	  WWAs,	  regardless	  of	  considerations	  of	  violation	  or	  conformity	  with	  prior	  commitments.	  Intuitive	  participants	  would	  tend	  to	  endorse	  the	  initial,	  intuitive	  high	  WWA.	  Only	  people	  with	  a	  reflective	  disposition	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  inhibit	  the	  automatic,	  intuitive	  tendency	  to	  group	  immoral	  action	  together	  with	  weakness	  of	  will,	  and	  moral	  action	  together	  with	  strength	  of	  will,	  and	  focus	  instead	  on	  violation	  or	  conformity	  with	  prior	  commitments.	  	  	  Our	  aim	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  influence	  of	  three	  variables	  on	  folk	  attributions	  of	  weakness	  of	  will:	  judgment	  violation,	  resolution	  violation,	  and	  moral	  valence	  of	  action.	  We	  also	  take	  into	  account	  the	  difference	  between	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  dispositions	  of	  participants.	  To	  this	  end	  we	  implement	  a	  2x2x2	  between–subjects	  design	  and	  use	  the	  Cognitive	  Reflection	  Test	  [CRT]	  to	  measure	  participants’	  cognitive	  dispositions.	  This	  design	  is	  intended,	  first,	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  concept	  of	  weakness	  of	  will	  works	  disjunctively	  or	  as	  a	  cluster	  by	  measuring	  judgment	  violation,	  resolution	  violation	  and	  action	  valence	  simultaneously;	  and,	  second,	  to	  test	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro’s	  prediction	  that	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  participants	  will	  display	  different	  WWA	  patterns.	  	  
2.	  Materials	  and	  Procedures	  Data	  were	  collected	  from	  students	  attending	  different	  courses	  at	  two	  universities.	  In	  total	  710	  students	  participated,	  mean	  age	  =	  21	  yrs.,	  39%	  female.	  Four	  were	  excluded	  for	  failing	  to	  complete	  the	  questionnaire.	  We	  devised	  8	  vignettes	  corresponding	  to	  the	  2x2x2	  design,	  where	  the	  only	  changes	  in	  the	  story	  concern	  the	  best	  judgment,	  the	  resolution	  made	  and	  the	  action	  performed	  by	  the	  protagonist.	  The	  story	  was	  kept	  as	  homogeneous	  as	  possible	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across	  all	  conditions	  (avoiding	  the	  use	  of	  different	  stories	  and	  characters	  for	  different	  conditions),	  and	  as	  simple	  as	  possible	  (eliminating	  explicit	  suggestions	  of	  hesitation	  or	  inner	  conflict),	  to	  avoid	  confounding	  factors.	  The	  story	  was	  presented	  in	  Spanish,	  the	  participants’	  native	  language.	  Here	  is	  an	  English	  translation	  (see	  Appendix	  for	  original	  version):	  	   Rodrigo	  and	  Alenka	  have	  been	  friends	  since	  childhood,	  and	  they	  live	  in	  the	  same	  house.	  Rodrigo	  is	  a	  student	  and	  Alenka	  has	  a	  job.	  Rodrigo	  has	  just	  won	  a	  considerable	  sum	  of	  money	  in	  a	  contest,	  but	  has	  not	  yet	  told	  Alenka	  about	  it.	  Unfortunately,	  she	  has	  just	  learned	  that	  she	  has	  contracted	  a	  deadly	  disease,	  whose	  only	  effective	  treatment	  is	  very	  expensive.	  Her	  savings	  are	  not	  enough.	  She	  tells	  Rodrigo	  about	  this,	  and	  he	  realizes	  that	  the	  sum	  he	  has	  just	  won	  would	  cover	  the	  remaining	  costs.	  He	  also	  knows	  that	  Alenka	  has	  no	  living	  relatives	  and	  that	  he	  will	  inherit	  her	  savings	  if	  she	  dies.	  He	  must	  decide	  in	  24	  hours	  and	  notify	  the	  hospital,	  because	  the	  treatment	  must	  begin	  immediately	  and	  be	  paid	  in	  advance.	  	  After	  pondering	  the	  alternatives,	  he	  concludes	  that	  the	  best	  thing	  to	  do	  is	  to	  (wait	  for	  Alenka	  to	  die	  and	  inherit	  her	  savings	  /	  help	  Alenka).	  (Therefore	  /	  However),	  he	  resolves	  to	  (await	  her	  death/	  help	  her).	  (Accordingly	  /	  However),	  when	  the	  time	  comes	  to	  notify	  the	  hospital,	  (he	  remains	  silent	  about	  his	  money	  and	  sits	  tight	  waiting	  for	  Alenka	  to	  die	  in	  order	  to	  inherit	  her	  savings	  /	  he	  announces	  that	  he	  will	  help	  her,	  and	  uses	  his	  contest	  money	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  treatment	  in	  advance.)	  	  The	  8	  stories	  differ	  only	  in	  whether	  the	  protagonist	  judges	  it	  best	  to	  spend	  his	  money	  (won	  in	  a	  contest)	  to	  save	  the	  life	  of	  a	  close	  friend	  by	  covering	  the	  cost	  of	  her	  medical	  treatment,	  or	  to	  keep	  the	  money	  for	  himself;	  whether	  he	  resolves	  to	  do	  the	  former	  or	  the	  latter;	  and	  whether	  he	  finally	  spends	  his	  money	  on	  his	  friend’s	  medical	  treatment	  or	  not.	  	  All	  other	  elements	  in	  the	  story	  remain	  the	  same.	  We	  thus	  have	  eight	  different	  conditions:	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(1) IM¬V	  =	  Immoral	  action	  and	  no	  violation	  of	  commitments	  (2) IM.JV	  =	  Immoral	  action	  and	  violation	  only	  of	  judgment	  (3) IM.RV	  =	  Immoral	  action	  and	  violation	  only	  of	  resolution	  (4) IM.JV&RV	  =	  Immoral	  action	  with	  judgment	  violation	  and	  resolution	  violation	  (5) MO¬V	  =	  Moral	  action	  and	  no	  violation	  of	  commitments	  (6) MO.JV	  =	  Moral	  action	  and	  violation	  only	  of	  judgment	  (7) MO.RV	  =	  Moral	  action	  and	  violation	  only	  of	  resolution	  (8) MO.JV&RV	  =	  Moral	  action	  with	  judgment	  violation	  and	  resolution	  violation	  	  Particularly,	  these	  stories	  include	  what	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro	  (2014)	  have	  called	  prototypical	  and	  non-­‐prototypical	  conditions.	  Their	  2	  non-­‐prototypical	  conditions	  (immoral	  commitments	  followed	  by	  immoral	  action	  [“IR	  &	  IA”],	  and	  immoral	  commitments	  violated	  by	  a	  moral	  action	  [“IR	  &	  MA”])	  correspond	  to	  conditions	  (1)	  and	  (8)	  respectively,	  and	  their	  2	  prototypical	  conditions	  (moral	  commitments	  followed	  by	  moral	  action	  [“MR	  &	  MA”],	  and	  moral	  commitments	  violated	  by	  immoral	  action	  [“MR	  &	  IA”])	  correspond	  to	  conditions	  (5)	  and	  (4)	  respectively.	  We	  additionally	  have	  4	  ‘mixed’	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  agent	  violates	  his	  judgment	  or	  his	  resolution,	  but	  not	  both,	  while	  acting	  immorally	  (2–3)	  or	  morally	  (6–7).	  These	  ‘mixed’	  conditions	  allow	  us	  to	  measure	  the	  independent	  significance	  of	  each	  variable:	  judgment	  violation,	  resolution	  violation,	  and	  action	  valence.	  	  	  Responses	  were	  collected	  with	  pen	  and	  paper	  in	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  design:	  each	  participant	  was	  shown	  only	  one	  of	  the	  8	  vignettes.	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  state	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  agreed	  with	  the	  statement	  “In	  this	  story,	  Rodrigo	  shows	  weakness	  of	  will.”	  Their	  answers	  were	  recorded	  in	  a	  Likert	  scale	  ranging	  from	  0	  (100%	  disagreement)	  to	  10	  (100%	  agreement),	  with	  5	  as	  a	  neutral	  midpoint.	  Additionally,	  all	  participants	  completed	  the	  CRT.	  The	  order	  of	  presentation	  between	  CRT	  and	  vignette	  was	  counterbalanced	  for	  all	  conditions.	  	  In	  his	  seminal	  paper,	  Frederick	  (2005)	  formed	  an	  “intuitive	  group”	  consisting	  of	  all	  participants	  who	  had	  had	  no	  correct	  answers	  in	  the	  CRT,	  and	  a	  “reflective	  group”	  consisting	  of	  all	  participants	  who	  had	  given	  correct	  answers	  for	  all	  3	  questions.	  He	  thus	  excluded	  
  9	  
participants	  with	  only	  1	  or	  2	  correct	  answers	  from	  his	  analysis.	  We	  departed	  slightly	  from	  Frederick’s	  procedure	  in	  constructing	  our	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  groups:	  our	  resulting	  reflective	  group	  would	  have	  been	  too	  small	  for	  the	  ANOVA,	  so	  we	  included	  in	  it	  participants	  with	  at	  least	  2	  correct	  answers.	  	  	  
3.	  Results	  A	  three	  way	  ANOVA	  on	  weakness	  of	  will	  attributions	  in	  the	  whole	  sample	  (N=513	  after	  excluding	  193	  participants	  who	  answered	  only	  1	  of	  the	  CRT	  questions	  correctly)	  showed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  for	  both	  judgment	  violation	  (F	  (1,	  505)	  =	  9.58,	  p	  =	  .002,	  𝜂!!  =	  .019)	  and	  resolution	  violation	  (F	  (1,	  505)	  =	  20.99,	  p	  =	  .000,	  𝜂!!  =	  .040).	  No	  interaction	  effects	  were	  observed.	  Subsequent	  three-­‐way	  ANOVAs	  were	  performed	  separately	  on	  the	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  groups.	  In	  the	  intuitive	  group	  (N=286),	  we	  found	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  only	  for	  judgment	  violation	  (F	  (1,278)	  =	  6.59,	  p	  =	  .011,	  𝜂!!  =	  .023),	  and	  a	  close	  to	  significant	  main	  effect	  for	  resolution	  violation	  (F	  (1,278)	  =	  3.772,	  p	  =	  .053,	  𝜂!!  	  =	  .01).	  In	  the	  reflective	  group	  (N=227),	  we	  found	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  only	  for	  resolution	  violation	  (F	  (1,	  219)	  =	  20.95,	  
p	  =	  .000,	  𝜂!  ! =	  .087),	  but	  no	  significant	  main	  effect	  for	  judgment	  violation	  (F	  (1,219)	  =	  2.660,	  p	  
=	  .104,	  𝜂!!  =	  .012).	  Action	  valence	  was	  close	  to	  significance	  in	  the	  intuitive	  group	  (F	  (1,	  278)	  =	  
3.38,	  p	  =	  .067,	  𝜂!!  =	  .012),	  but	  quite	  far	  from	  being	  significant	  for	  the	  reflective	  group	  (F	  (1,	  
219)	  =	  .073,	  p	  =	  .79,	  	  𝜂!  ! =	  .000).	  In	  the	  intuitive	  group	  there	  was	  a	  statistically	  significant	  interaction	  between	  resolution	  and	  judgment	  (F	  (1,278)	  =	  5.68,	  p	  =	  .018,	  𝜂!!	  =	  .020),	  and	  between	  resolution	  and	  action	  valence	  (F	  (1,	  278)=	  4.17,	  p	  =	  .042,	  𝜂!!  =	  .015).	  No	  interaction	  effects	  were	  found	  in	  the	  reflective	  group.	   	  
4.	  Discussion	  Our	  results	  for	  the	  whole	  sample	  partially	  replicate	  the	  results	  of	  May	  &	  Holton’s	  (2012)	  experiment	  2.	  Violations	  of	  both	  judgment	  and	  resolution	  had	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  on	  weakness	  of	  will	  attributions.	  Our	  F	  and	  p	  values	  were	  similar	  to	  theirs	  (May	  &	  Holton	  2012,	  fn.	  8).	  No	  interaction	  effects	  were	  observed.	  We	  did	  not	  get	  clear-­‐cut	  evidence	  for	  or	  against	  the	  disjunctive	  or	  the	  cluster	  interpretations	  of	  the	  concept	  in	  the	  whole	  sample.	  	  A	  pairwise	  comparison	  of	  means	  by	  vignettes	  revealed	  that	  when	  the	  action	  is	  immoral	  (conditions	  1–
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4),	  only	  the	  violations	  of	  judgment	  and	  resolution	  together	  (condition	  4)	  were	  significantly	  different	  from	  violation	  of	  neither	  (condition	  1)	  (p	  =	  .007).	  This	  supports	  May	  &	  Holton’s	  cluster	  interpretation;	  but	  when	  the	  action	  is	  moral	  (conditions	  5–8),	  each	  commitment	  violation,	  and	  the	  violation	  of	  both	  together	  (conditions	  6–8),	  were	  significantly	  different	  from	  no	  violation	  (condition	  5),	  supporting	  Mele’s	  (2010)	  disjunctive	  interpretation	  (all	  p	  <	  
.005;	  see	  Fig.	  1).	  Thus,	  for	  the	  group	  as	  a	  whole,	  it	  seems	  that	  weakness	  of	  will	  works	  as	  a	  
disjunctive	  concept	  when	  the	  agent	  under	  consideration	  performs	  a	  moral	  action	  (so	  that	  the	  violation	  of	  any	  commitment	  can	  sufficiently	  motivate	  the	  attribution	  of	  weakness	  of	  will),	  but	  it	  works	  as	  a	  cluster	  concept	  when	  the	  agent	  performs	  an	  immoral	  action	  (so	  that	  only	  the	  violation	  of	  both	  commitments	  together	  makes	  the	  attribution	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  violation	  of	  neither).	  
 
 
 Figure	  1:	  Mean	  weakness	  of	  will	  by	  vignette	  in	  the	  whole	  sample.	  Mean	  scores	  are	  represented	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  10.	  Error	  bars:	  95%	  CI	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However,	  when	  analyses	  are	  performed	  on	  the	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  groups	  separately,	  the	  results	  are	  drastically	  different:	  in	  the	  intuitive	  group	  only	  judgment	  violation	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  weakness	  of	  will	  attribution,	  whereas	  in	  the	  reflective	  group	  only	  resolution	  violation	  had	  an	  effect	  (see	  all	  mean	  WWA	  by	  group	  and	  condition	  in	  table	  1	  and	  table	  2	  in	  the	  appendix).	  In	  the	  intuitive	  group	  we	  observed	  two	  interaction	  effects:	  between	  resolution	  and	  judgment,	  and	  between	  resolution	  and	  action	  valence.	  A	  pairwise	  comparison	  of	  means	  by	  vignettes	  revealed	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  both	  judgment	  and	  resolution	  was	  present	  only	  in	  the	  moral	  action	  conditions	  (MO),	  but	  absent	  in	  the	  immoral	  action	  conditions	  (IM).	  In	  the	  moral	  action	  cases,	  each	  violation	  separately	  and	  both	  together	  were	  significantly	  different	  from	  violation	  of	  neither	  (p	  =	  .000	  in	  all	  cases	  with	  moral	  action;	  p	  >	  .1	  in	  all	  cases	  with	  immoral	  action);	  in	  the	  immoral	  action	  cases,	  the	  mean	  scores	  of	  weakness	  of	  will	  attribution	  ranged	  between	  4.94	  	  (lowest)	  when	  neither	  commitment	  was	  violated,	  and	  6.05	  (highest)	  when	  judgment	  was	  violated	  (5	  being	  the	  neutral	  score),	  with	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  them	  (p	  =	  .191).	  Thus,	  since	  neither	  violation	  of,	  nor	  compliance	  with,	  either	  judgment	  or	  resolution	  made	  a	  significant	  difference	  to	  WWA	  in	  cases	  of	  immoral	  action,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  action’s	  immoral	  valence	  that	  predominantly	  guides	  WWA	  for	  intuitive	  participants	  in	  conditions	  1–4.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  the	  action’s	  valence	  had	  no	  main	  significant	  effect	  in	  the	  intuitive	  group	  (though	  it	  did	  come	  close	  to	  significance,	  p	  =	  
.067).	  Statistically,	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  action’s	  moral	  valence	  did	  not	  drive	  WWA	  in	  the	  case	  of	  moral	  actions	  violating	  immoral	  commitments	  (conditions	  6–8).	  Conceptually,	  this	  is	  certainly	  an	  intriguing	  result	  demanding	  a	  careful	  explanation.	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 Figure	  2:	  Mean	  weakness	  of	  will	  attributions	  by	  vignette	  in	  the	  reflective	  (dotted	  line)	  and	  intuitive	  (full	  line)	  groups.	  Mean	  scores	  are	  represented	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  10.	  	  The	  result	  is	  intriguing	  in	  light	  of	  a	  very	  plausible	  hypothesis	  by	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro	  (2014).	  In	  their	  experiment	  2,	  the	  attributions	  of	  most	  participants	  in	  the	  non-­‐prototypical	  conditions	  –	  conditions	  (1)	  and	  (8)	  in	  the	  present	  study	  –	  contradicted	  the	  philosophical	  concept	  of	  weakness	  of	  will:	  63%	  denied	  strength	  of	  will	  when	  the	  agent	  complied	  with	  his	  immoral	  commitments	  acting	  immorally,	  and	  60%	  denied	  weakness	  of	  will	  when	  the	  agent	  violated	  his	  immoral	  commitments	  acting	  morally.	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro	  (2014,	  502)	  hypothesized	  that	  these	  participants	  probably	  had	  an	  intuitive	  cognitive	  disposition,	  whereas	  those	  who	  made	  attributions	  consistent	  with	  the	  traditional	  philosophical	  concept	  in	  these	  conditions	  probably	  had	  a	  reflective	  disposition.	  	  	  We	  confirmed	  their	  hypothesis	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  reflective	  group:	  reflective	  participants	  strictly	  apply	  the	  philosophical	  concept	  in	  the	  two	  non-­‐prototypical	  conditions,	  attributing	  less	  weakness	  of	  will	  in	  condition	  (1)	  (immoral	  action	  with	  no	  violation	  of	  immoral	  commitments),	  and	  greater	  weakness	  of	  will	  in	  condition	  (8)	  (moral	  action	  with	  violation	  of	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immoral	  commitments).	  Moreover,	  the	  attributions	  of	  reflective	  participants	  were	  otherwise	  unaffected	  by	  the	  action’s	  moral	  valence:	  a	  pairwise	  comparison	  of	  means	  reveals	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  WWA	  between	  condition	  (1),	  where	  the	  agent	  acted	  immorally	  consistently	  with	  his	  immoral	  commitments,	  and	  condition	  (5),	  where	  the	  agent	  acted	  morally	  consistently	  with	  his	  moral	  commitments	  (p	  =	  .950).	  If	  moral	  valence	  had	  had	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  WWA,	  attribution	  levels	  would	  have	  been	  significantly	  greater	  in	  case	  (1)	  than	  in	  case	  (5).	  Thus,	  Sousa	  and	  Mauro	  seem	  to	  be	  right	  about	  the	  reflective	  participants:	  a	  reflective	  disposition	  is	  correlated	  with	  moral	  valence	  having	  no	  influence	  on	  WWA.	  	  But	  our	  data	  only	  partially	  corroborate	  their	  hypothesis	  regarding	  the	  intuitive	  group.	  The	  hypothesis	  predicted	  that	  the	  valence	  of	  the	  action	  would	  drive	  WWA.	  That	  is,	  when	  the	  action	  is	  immoral,	  it	  predicts	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  WWA	  scores	  between	  condition	  (1),	  where	  no	  violation	  occurs,	  and	  conditions	  (2-­‐4),	  where	  either	  or	  both	  violations	  occur,	  simply	  because	  of	  the	  immoral	  valence	  of	  the	  action;	  and	  when	  the	  action	  is	  moral,	  it	  predicts	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  WWA	  scores	  between	  conditions	  (6-­‐8),	  where	  violation	  occurs,	  and	  condition	  (5),	  where	  no	  violation	  occurs.	  But	  only	  the	  former	  was	  confirmed.	  The	  mean	  for	  intuitive	  participants	  in	  condition	  (1)	  was	  4.94,	  relatively	  high	  for	  a	  condition	  where	  neither	  commitment	  is	  violated,	  and	  not	  significantly	  different	  (p	  =	  .191)	  from	  the	  scores	  of	  conditions	  (2-­‐4)	  where	  the	  agent	  violates	  either	  or	  both	  commitments	  (the	  highest	  mean	  score	  for	  the	  intuitive	  participants	  in	  these	  conditions	  was	  6.05	  in	  condition	  (2)).	  So	  far,	  Sousa	  and	  Mauro’s	  hypothesis	  succeeds	  in	  predicting	  the	  WWA	  of	  intuitive	  participants.	  But	  their	  scores	  in	  conditions	  (6-­‐8)	  are	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  score	  in	  condition	  (5)	  (see	  Fig.	  2,	  continuous	  line).	  Our	  intuitive	  participants	  do	  not	  distinguish	  (statistically)	  between	  agents	  who	  act	  immorally	  while	  abiding	  by	  immoral	  commitments	  (condition	  1),	  and	  agents	  who	  act	  immorally	  while	  violating	  moral	  ones	  (conditions	  2-­‐4)	  But	  they	  do	  distinguish	  between	  agents	  who	  act	  morally	  while	  abiding	  by	  moral	  commitments	  (5)	  and	  those	  who	  act	  morally	  while	  violating	  immoral	  commitments	  (6-­‐8)	  (p=	  .001)	  (see	  Fig	  2,	  continuous	  line).	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We	  must	  therefore	  conclude	  that,	  although	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  WWA	  between	  the	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  groups,	  it	  is	  not	  fully	  explained	  by	  Sousa	  and	  Mauro’s	  hypothesis:	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  intuitive	  participants	  were	  fully	  guided	  by	  the	  action’s	  moral	  valence	  in	  all	  non-­‐prototypical	  conditions.	  Particularly,	  when	  the	  agent	  acted	  morally	  violating	  prior	  commitments	  (conditions	  6–8),	  the	  action’s	  moral	  valence	  did	  not	  lead	  them	  to	  attributing	  low	  levels	  of	  weakness	  of	  will.	  	  Focusing	  now	  on	  condition	  (8),	  which	  corresponds	  to	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro’s	  (2014)	  non-­‐prototypical	  case	  where	  the	  agent	  violated	  immoral	  commitments	  by	  acting	  morally	  (“IR	  &	  MA”),	  our	  intuitive	  participants	  were	  in	  overall	  disagreement	  (see	  Fig.	  3).	  In	  this	  condition,	  46%	  of	  participants	  (labeled	  “-­‐1”,	  N=17)	  attributed	  scores	  of	  weakness	  of	  will	  higher	  than	  5;	  35%	  (labeled	  “1”,	  N	  =13)	  attributed	  scores	  lower	  than	  5;	  and	  19%	  (labeled	  “0”,	  N=7)	  gave	  a	  neutral	  attribution	  of	  5.	  According	  to	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro’s	  hypothesis,	  a	  majority	  should	  have	  given	  WWA	  scores	  lower	  than	  5	  and	  statistically	  equivalent	  to	  that	  of	  condition	  (5),	  where	  the	  action	  is	  moral	  and	  no	  commitments	  are	  violated.	  	  	  
	  Figure	  3:	  Distribution	  of	  responses	  for	  the	  intuitive	  participants	  in	  the	  non-­‐prototypical	  case	  where	  the	  agent	  acts	  morally	  violating	  immoral	  judgment	  and	  immoral	  resolution.	  Weakness	  of	  will	  =	  -­‐1;	  No	  weakness	  of	  will	  =	  1;	  Neutral	  =	  0.	  	  	  Thus	  it	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  action	  valence	  failed	  to	  reach	  the	  significance	  level	  of	  .05	  in	  the	  intuitive	  group	  (though	  it	  almost	  did):	  action	  valence	  explains	  WWA	  in	  all	  the	  conditions	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with	  immoral	  action,	  but	  not	  in	  all	  the	  conditions	  with	  moral	  action.	  Why	  were	  intuitive	  participants	  apparently	  insensitive	  to	  the	  action’s	  valence	  in	  conditions	  6-­‐8?	  A	  possible	  explanation	  lies	  in	  wording	  differences	  between	  our	  vignettes	  and	  those	  of	  Sousa	  &	  Mauro.	  In	  all	  their	  vignettes,	  the	  agent	  is	  portrayed	  as	  undergoing	  an	  inner	  conflict	  between	  moral	  and	  immoral	  motivations:	  he	  “seriously	  envisages”	  the	  immoral	  action,	  but	  is	  also	  “strongly	  inclined”	  to	  act	  morally.	  Had	  we	  formulated	  our	  vignettes	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  perhaps	  participants	  would	  have	  interpreted	  the	  agent	  in	  conditions	  6–8	  as	  being	  swayed	  by	  his	  previous	  moral	  considerations	  and	  would	  have	  given	  low	  WWA	  scores.	  However,	  this	  explanation	  cannot	  be	  swiftly	  applied	  to	  our	  findings,	  because,	  if	  the	  wording	  caused	  problems	  in	  the	  moral	  conditions,	  it	  should	  have	  caused	  the	  same	  effect	  in	  the	  immoral	  conditions,	  and	  it	  obviously	  did	  not.	  	  Thus,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  explained	  why	  the	  moral	  valence	  of	  the	  action	  did	  not	  decrease	  the	  intuitive	  participants’	  WWA	  score	  in	  conditions	  (6-­‐8).	  	  We	  see	  here	  two	  possibilities,	  although	  we	  shall	  not	  develop	  them	  in	  full.	  The	  first	  one	  has	  to	  do	  with	  difficulties	  in	  the	  CRT	  as	  a	  test	  of	  reflective	  dispositions.	  As	  some	  have	  argued	  (Sinayev	  and	  Peters	  2016),	  the	  CRT	  measures	  numeric	  abilities	  rather	  than	  just	  dispositions	  to	  inhibit	  intuitive	  responses.	  Participants	  may	  have	  failed	  the	  CRT	  for	  lack	  of	  numerical	  abilities	  and	  thus,	  though	  reflective,	  were	  classified	  as	  intuitive,	  but	  nonetheless	  focused	  on	  the	  violation	  of	  commitments	  in	  the	  case	  of	  moral	  actions.	  	  	  More	  likely,	  however,	  the	  relevant	  explanation	  for	  this	  pattern	  is	  that	  intuitive	  participants’	  susceptibility	  to	  moral	  valence	  extends	  beyond	  actions,	  and	  also	  includes	  the	  moral	  valence	  of	  commitments.	  In	  conditions	  (6–8),	  the	  agent	  acts	  morally	  while	  violating	  a	  prior	  immoral	  commitment	  (Rodrigo	  gives	  the	  money	  to	  Alenka	  despite	  having	  earlier	  judged	  it	  better,	  or	  having	  resolved,	  to	  wait	  for	  her	  to	  die	  and	  inherit	  her	  savings).	  Thus,	  while	  conditions	  (1–4)	  are	  cases	  of	  immoral	  action,	  conditions	  (6–8)	  are	  cases	  of	  immoral	  prior	  commitments.	  Condition	  (5)	  is	  the	  only	  case	  in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  immoral	  element	  to	  Rodrigo’s	  character.	  The	  fact	  that	  intuitive	  participants	  produced	  higher	  WWAs	  in	  all	  conditions	  but	  condition	  (5)	  suggests	  that	  they	  were	  influenced,	  not	  only	  by	  the	  immorality	  of	  Rodrigo’s	  action,	  but	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also	  by	  the	  immorality	  of	  Rodrigo’s	  prior	  commitments.	  We	  note	  that	  our	  design	  is	  not	  suited	  to	  test	  this	  interpretation.	  We	  did	  no	  treat	  the	  moral	  valence	  of	  commitments	  as	  a	  variable.	  We	  do	  emphasize,	  however,	  that	  our	  results	  suggest	  it,	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  adequate	  to	  consider	  it	  in	  the	  design	  of	  future	  studies.	  	  Hence	  the	  evidence	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that,	  while	  intuitive	  participants	  attribute	  high	  WWA	  to	  any	  case	  that	  includes	  an	  immoral	  element	  (be	  it	  an	  immoral	  action	  or	  an	  immoral	  commitment),	  the	  WWAs	  of	  reflective	  participants	  are	  unaffected	  by	  moral	  value,	  and	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  violation	  of	  a	  specific	  kind	  of	  prior	  commitment:	  resolutions.	  	  
Two	  concepts	  of	  weakness	  of	  will	  The	  analysis	  thus	  suggests	  a	  form	  of	  concept	  pluralism.	  We	  are	  in	  fact	  either	  dealing	  with	  a	  concept	  that	  has	  two	  distinct	  structures	  (Laurence	  &	  Margolis	  1999),	  or	  with	  two	  concepts,	  each	  with	  a	  different	  structure	  (Weiskopf	  2009).	  The	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  groups	  seem	  to	  be	  using	  either	  two	  different	  structures	  of	  the	  same	  concept	  of	  WEAK	  WILL,	  or	  two	  structurally	  heterogeneous	  WEAK	  WILL	  concepts,	  given	  that	  each	  group	  performs	  different,	  and	  inconsistent,	  categorizations.	  	  Against	  this	  reading,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  say	  that	  both	  groups	  are	  using	  one	  and	  the	  same	  WEAK	  WILL	  concept,	  with	  one	  and	  the	  same	  conceptual	  structure,	  but	  that	  one	  of	  the	  groups	  categorizes	  agents	  differently	  because	  influenced	  by	  irrelevant	  or	  concept-­‐extraneous	  features.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  all	  participants	  have	  the	  same	  concept	  of	  WEAK	  WILL	  (say,	  ‘A	  person	  who	  violates	  prior	  commitments	  has	  a	  weak	  will’),	  but	  that	  intuitive	  participants	  are	  additionally	  influenced	  by	  a	  concept-­‐extraneous	  element:	  their	  negative	  evaluation	  of	  Rodrigo’s	  character	  (due	  either	  to	  his	  immoral	  action	  or	  to	  his	  immoral	  commitments).	  This	  external	  element’s	  influence	  would	  lead	  intuitive	  participants	  to	  provide	  higher	  WWAs	  for	  Rodrigo	  whenever	  they	  evaluate	  him	  negatively.	  Thus,	  although	  the	  WWAs	  of	  reflective	  participants	  are	  different	  (because	  they	  remain	  unaffected	  by	  
  17	  
negative	  evaluations	  of	  Rodrigo’s	  actions	  or	  commitments),	  both	  groups	  could	  be	  using	  one	  and	  the	  same	  concept,	  with	  one	  and	  the	  same	  structure.1	  	  Thus,	  there	  are	  two	  main	  possible	  interpretations:	  a	  dual-­‐concept	  interpretation	  (each	  group	  applies	  a	  different	  concept,	  or	  a	  different	  structure	  of	  a	  single	  concept),	  and	  a	  common-­‐concept	  interpretation	  (both	  groups	  apply	  the	  same	  concept,	  but	  one	  of	  them	  is	  also	  influenced	  by	  concept-­‐extraneous	  elements).	  The	  evidence,	  however,	  does	  not	  support	  the	  latter	  view.	  For	  if	  there	  was	  a	  common	  concept,	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to	  infer	  some	  definitional	  element	  of	  the	  common	  concept	  from	  the	  WWAs	  of	  both	  groups.	  But	  what	  would	  that	  definitional	  element	  be?	  	  There	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  one,	  if	  we	  take	  at	  face	  value	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  our	  data	  are	  pointing.	  As	  we	  conjectured	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  intuitive	  participants	  attribute	  high	  WWA	  to	  any	  case	  that	  includes	  an	  immoral	  element	  (be	  it	  an	  immoral	  action	  or	  an	  immoral	  commitment),	  whereas	  reflective	  participants	  are	  unaffected	  by	  moral	  value,	  and	  base	  their	  WWA	  solely	  on	  the	  violation	  of	  resolutions.	  	  A	  common	  definitional	  element	  appears	  to	  be	  absent.	  Rather,	  the	  intuitive	  group	  wields	  a	  concept	  of	  WEAK	  WILL	  with	  a	  core	  trait	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  negative	  evaluation:	  	   (WW1)	  A	  weak	  will	  is	  a	  bad	  will;	  	  	  whereas	  the	  reflective	  group	  employs	  a	  concept	  of	  WEAK	  WILL	  with	  a	  core	  trait	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  resolution	  violation:	  	  	   (WW2)	  If	  a	  person	  acts	  in	  a	  way	  that	  violates	  a	  prior	  resolution,	  (s)he	  is	  weak-­‐willed.	  	  WW1	  has	  a	  prototypical	  structure	  based	  on	  an	  association	  between	  weakness	  of	  will	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  either	  acting	  immorally	  or	  having	  immoral	  commitments	  (judgment	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  We	  thank	  two	  anonymous	  reviewers	  for	  raising	  this	  issue.	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resolution	  or	  both)	  on	  the	  other,	  so	  that	  the	  WEAK	  WILL	  concept	  applies	  whenever	  either	  of	  these	  two	  conditions	  is	  met.	  Accordingly,	  intuitive	  participants	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  violations,	  but	  on	  any	  aspect	  of	  the	  actions	  and/or	  commitments	  that	  elicits	  a	  negative	  evaluation.	  Just	  like	  people	  who	  go	  for	  their	  first	  intuition	  in	  the	  CRT,	  intuitive	  participants	  follow	  a	  heuristic,	  intuition-­‐based	  categorization	  process	  based	  on	  this	  association	  between	  bad	  will	  and	  weak	  will.	  	  	  WW2	  is	  a	  different	  concept2	  that	  takes	  the	  violation	  of	  a	  resolution,	  independently	  of	  its	  moral	  valence,	  as	  a	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  criterion	  for	  its	  application.	  Reflective	  judges	  treat	  resolutions	  as	  the	  sole	  relevant	  commitment	  (perhaps	  because	  they	  take	  resolutions	  to	  reliably	  reflect	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  judgments),	  and	  they	  also	  treat	  moral	  valence	  as	  irrelevant	  (perhaps	  because	  they	  consider	  moral	  valence	  and	  strength	  of	  will	  to	  be	  independent	  evaluative	  registers),	  so	  that	  neither	  violation	  of	  best	  judgment	  nor	  moral	  valence	  warrants	  categorization	  of	  the	  agent	  as	  weak-­‐willed.	  Just	  like	  those	  who	  refrain	  from	  following	  their	  first	  intuition	  in	  the	  CRT,	  and	  check	  their	  answers	  by	  means	  of	  effortful,	  rule-­‐based	  processes,	  reflective	  participants	  refrain	  from	  following	  the	  intuitive,	  heuristic	  classification	  of	  all	  bad	  wills	  as	  weak	  wills,	  and	  engage	  their	  reflection	  to	  assess	  whether	  a	  bad	  will	  may	  also	  be	  strong.	  This	  requires	  treating	  WEAK	  WILL	  as	  a	  concept	  based	  on	  a	  classification	  rule,	  not	  merely	  on	  an	  association.	  	  	  This	  explains	  why	  differences	  in	  cognitive	  disposition	  are	  correlated	  with	  differences	  in	  weakness	  of	  will	  attribution.	  Most	  participants	  tend	  to	  base	  their	  WWA	  on	  an	  automatic,	  heuristic	  process	  based	  on	  the	  association	  between	  negatively-­‐valenced	  terms	  like	  weakness	  of	  will	  and	  immorality.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  participants	  would	  give	  higher	  WWA	  to	  all	  conditions	  except	  condition	  (5),	  because	  all	  other	  conditions	  have	  some	  element	  that	  calls	  for	  a	  negative	  evaluation	  (be	  it	  immoral	  action	  or	  immoral	  commitment).	  From	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  We	  concede	  as	  possible	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  one	  and	  the	  same	  concept	  with	  two	  different	  core	  structures.	  In	  this	  case,	  despite	  the	  different	  structures,	  the	  concept	  is	  used	  invariably	  to	  make	  a	  negative	  evaluation	  of	  a	  person’s	  character,	  though	  supported	  in	  each	  case	  in	  different	  features	  of	  her	  character.	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this	  perspective,	  a	  bad	  will	  is	  a	  weak	  will,	  and	  a	  weak	  will	  is	  a	  bad	  will.	  Only	  reflective	  participants	  are	  disposed	  to	  take	  distance	  from	  this	  heuristic	  categorization,	  and	  subject	  it	  to	  critical	  evaluation.	  	  
5.	  Conclusions	  No	  previous	  study	  of	  folk	  attributions	  of	  weakness	  of	  will	  included	  all	  three	  variables	  studied	  here,	  and	  no	  other	  study	  had	  previously	  measured	  the	  cognitive	  dispositions	  of	  participants.	  Through	  this	  design	  our	  study	  offers	  good	  evidence	  towards	  answering	  the	  question	  regarding	  the	  relative	  roles	  of	  judgment	  violation	  and	  resolution	  violation	  in	  WWA.	  For	  one,	  our	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  results	  from	  May	  &	  Holton	  (2012),	  which	  point	  to	  the	  cluster	  character	  of	  the	  folk	  concept	  of	  weakness	  of	  will,	  may	  be	  an	  artifact	  of	  pooling	  together	  two	  different	  types	  of	  responses	  coming	  from	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  participants.	  Instead,	  we	  find	  evidence	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  participants	  have	  different	  concepts	  (or	  engage	  different	  structures	  of	  one	  same	  concept)	  of	  weakness	  of	  will,	  each	  with	  a	  seemingly	  different	  structure.	  The	  intuitive	  participants	  treat	  the	  concept	  as	  disjunctive	  (à	  la	  Mele	  2010).	  	  More	  specifically,	  when	  the	  agent	  acts	  immorally,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  matter	  much	  for	  intuitive	  participants	  whether	  the	  agent	  violated	  or	  complied	  with	  prior	  commitments.	  The	  scores	  of	  WWA	  are	  not	  significantly	  different	  in	  any	  of	  the	  conditions	  with	  immoral	  action.	  But	  when	  the	  agent	  acts	  morally,	  the	  immoral	  character	  of	  any	  commitment	  (be	  it	  judgment,	  resolution,	  or	  both)	  significantly	  increases	  WWA.	  In	  contrast,	  participants	  in	  the	  reflective	  group	  seem	  to	  use	  resolution	  violation	  as	  the	  sole	  criterion	  to	  attribute	  weakness	  of	  will.	  Holton’s	  (1999)	  original	  intuitions	  seem	  to	  have	  captured	  the	  reflective	  group’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept.	  	  	  The	  difference	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  weakness	  of	  will	  as	  used	  by	  the	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  groups	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  differential	  significance	  of	  moral	  valence	  in	  WWA.	  Intuitive	  participants	  attribute	  significantly	  less	  weakness	  to	  an	  agent	  who	  does	  not	  violate	  any	  prior	  commitments	  only	  if	  his	  action	  is	  moral,	  but	  make	  similar	  WWA	  to	  an	  agent	  who	  performs	  an	  immoral	  action,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  he	  violates	  a	  prior	  commitment	  or	  not.	  In	  contrast,	  reflective	  participants	  are	  impervious	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  action’s	  or	  the	  prior	  commitments’	  moral	  valences,	  and	  attribute	  significantly	  less	  weakness	  of	  will	  to	  an	  agent	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who	  does	  not	  violate	  any	  prior	  commitments,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  action,	  or	  the	  prior	  commitments,	  are	  moral	  or	  immoral.	  	  	  All	  in	  all,	  our	  study	  provides	  strong	  evidence	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  differences	  in	  the	  cognitive	  dispositions	  of	  participants	  result	  in	  a	  differential	  understanding	  of	  the	  folk	  concept	  of	  weakness	  of	  will.	  This	  is	  also	  a	  cautionary	  note	  for	  future	  experimental	  studies	  into	  other	  folk	  concepts	  of	  interest	  to	  philosophers.	  Speaking	  about	  the	  folk	  concept	  of	  a	  philosophical	  term	  may	  be	  too	  hasty,	  since	  cognitive	  differences	  between	  participants	  may	  lead	  them	  to	  approach	  thought	  experiments	  differently,	  and	  handle	  the	  underlying	  philosophical	  concepts	  in	  diverse	  ways,	  or	  apply	  concepts	  with	  different	  structures.	  To	  what	  extent	  philosophical	  analysis	  should	  be	  responsive	  to	  folk	  concepts	  remains	  a	  matter	  of	  open	  debate,	  but	  whatever	  the	  result	  of	  that	  debate	  is,	  the	  analysis	  of	  folk	  concepts	  itself	  would	  benefit	  from	  taking	  cognitive	  dispositions	  into	  account,	  for	  it	  may	  help	  in	  avoiding	  unwarranted	  generalizations.	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Appendix	  We	  append	  the	  Spanish	  version	  of	  the	  vignette	  and	  its	  8	  variations.	  The	  parts	  that	  change	  from	  vignette	  to	  vignette	  are	  given	  in	  brackets.	  	  
Por	  favor	  lea	  atentamente	  la	  siguiente	  historia	  (Please	  read	  the	  following	  story	  attentively):	  	   Rodrigo	   y	   Alenka	   son	   amigos	   desde	   la	   niñez	   y	   viven	   en	   la	   misma	   casa.	   Rodrigo	  estudia	  y	  Alenka	  trabaja.	  Rodrigo	  acaba	  de	  ganar	  una	  buena	  suma	  de	  dinero	  en	  un	  concurso,	  pero	  aún	  no	  se	   lo	  ha	  contado	  a	  Alenka.	  Desafortunadamente,	  ella	  acaba	  de	   enterarse	   de	   que	   sufre	   de	   una	   enfermedad	   mortal,	   cuyo	   único	   tratamiento	  efectivo	  es	  muy	  costoso.	  Sus	  ahorros	  no	  alcanzan.	  Ella	  le	  comenta	  esto	  a	  Rodrigo	  y	  él	   se	   da	   cuenta	   de	   que	   la	   suma	   que	   él	   ha	   ganado	   completaría	   el	   costo	   del	  tratamiento.	  Sabe,	  además,	  que	  Alenka	  no	  tiene	  parientes	  vivos,	  y	  que	  si	  ella	  muere,	  él	  heredará	  sus	  ahorros.	  Debe	  tomar	  una	  decisión	  en	  24	  horas	  y	  avisar	  al	  hospital,	  pues	  el	  tratamiento	  debe	  comenzar	  de	  inmediato	  y	  hay	  que	  pagar	  por	  anticipado.	  Después	   de	   sopesar	   las	   alternativas,	   concluye	   que	   lo	   mejor	   que	   puede	   hacer	   es	  (esperar	   que	   Alenka	   muera	   y	   a	   heredar	   sus	   ahorros/ayudar	   a	   Alenka).	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(Entonces/Sin	  embargo)	  resuelve	  (esperar	  a	  que	  muera/ayudarla).	  (En	  efecto/Sin	  embargo)	  cuando	  llega	  el	  momento	  de	  avisar	  al	  hospital,	  (calla	  sobre	  el	  dinero	  del	  que	  dispone,	  y	  espera	  a	  que	  Alenka	  muera	  para	  heredar	  sus	  ahorros/anuncia	  que	  va	   a	   ayudarla	   y	   usa	   el	   dinero	   de	   su	   concurso	   para	   pagar	   el	   tratamiento	   por	  anticipado).	  
¿Qué	  tan	  de	  acuerdo	  está	  Ud.	  con	  la	  siguiente	  afirmación?	  	  	   “En	  esta	  historia,	  Rodrigo	  demuestra	  una	  voluntad	  débil.”	  Marque	  un	  número	  del	  0	  al	  10	  	  








Table 1: Mean WWA for intuitive participants by condition (vignette) 
Vignette N Range Mean Std. Deviation 
IM¬V WeakW 35 10 4.94 4.284 
Valid N (listwise) 35    
IM.JV WeakW 38 10 6.05 3.827 
Valid N (listwise) 38    
IM.RV WeakW 39 10 5.10 3.575 
Valid N (listwise) 39    
IM.JV&RV WeakW 26 10 5.81 3.383 
Valid N (listwise) 26    
MO¬V WeakW 41 10 2.24 3.200 
Valid N (listwise) 41    
MO.JV WeakW 32 10 5.41 3.600 
Valid N (listwise) 32    
MO.RV WeakW 38 10 5.82 3.220 
Valid N (listwise) 38    
MO.JV&RV WeakW 37 10 5.27 3.717 
Valid N (listwise) 37    
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Table 2: Mean WWA for reflective participants by condition (vignette) 
Vignette N Range Mean Std. Deviation 
IM¬V WeakW 26 10 3.42 3.982 
Valid N (listwise) 26    
IM.JV WeakW 26 10 4.19 3.990 
Valid N (listwise) 26    
IM.RV WeakW 27 10 5.70 4.017 
Valid N (listwise) 27    
IM.JV&RV WeakW 35 10 6.26 3.576 
Valid N (listwise) 35    
MO¬V WeakW 25 10 3.36 3.290 
Valid N (listwise) 25    
MO.JV WeakW 31 10 3.94 3.511 
Valid N (listwise) 31    
MO.RV WeakW 27 10 5.26 3.601 
Valid N (listwise) 27    
MO.JV&RV WeakW 30 9 6.50 2.813 
Valid N (listwise) 30    
 
 
